













Department of Economics 
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 
Via Berengario 51 - 27100 Modena - Italy 
Phone: (+) 39 059 2056833 











  This paper contain an empirical analysis on the most relevant determinants of heterogeneity in 
Italian banks’ lending rate and lending behaviour, performed with descriptive statistics and dynamic panel 
data analysis on the basis of a “mesoeconomic” data set specifically acquired from the Bank of Italy, 
which contains the data on interest rates, bad debts and credit flows granted by different size categories of 
banks under the form of different size categories of loans in different geographic areas of the country, for 
the period 1990 QI –1998 QIV.   The purpose of the econometric analyses is twofold: First, investigating 
the possible disturbances affecting the link between policy rate and interest rates on bank credit; second  
verify whether the behaviour of the largest bank loans is demand-determined. The results show that the 
spread between interest rate on the various classes of bank loans and the monetary policy rate is not 
influenced by the loan size, while it seems to be more affected by proxies for risk and competitive 
configuration of the banking sector. Furthermore, the behaviour of the largest size class of bank loans 
does show a pattern consistent with a “demand determined” behaviour.  
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  According to a well-known statement of the credit view, the monetary policy propagation process 
takes place both trough banks’ assets (loans) and banks’ liabilities (money).  A great deal of empirical 
research in that field focuses therefore on the behaviour of interest rates spreads as well as credit supply in 
different phases of the business cycle to different categories of borrowers. The more common empirical 
tools to investigate these issues are either VAR models analysing the behaviour of credit aggregates, 
interest rate spreads and the way these variables affect economic activity, or, more recently, dynamic 
panel data estimates based on individual firms (or individual banks) observations.  The former directly 
focuses on the behaviour of macroeconomic and policy variables, the latter have the advantage of 
modelling individual agents and accounting for disaggregated behaviour and heterogeneity.  The use of 
“mesoeconomic” dataset, on the contrary, might allow to analyse the interactions between some 
macroeconomic policy variables and the behaviour of variables associated to different categories of 
agents. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, performing a simple analysis (both descriptive and 
econometric) on the possible disturbances affecting the link between policy rate and interest rates on bank 
credit. Since we are interested in heterogeneity, the second purpose of the paper aims at investigating a 
very relevant element of heterogeneity, i.e. verifying whether the behaviour of the largest size class of 
loans is demand-determined. To do that we will focus on the share of the largest size class of loans over 
the total: if the behaviour of this variable appears to be demand-determined, then, for a given level of 
credit supply, the share of the other size classes is a sort of “residual” variable, and bank credit would be 
allocated according to a sort of implicit hierarchy according to the size class of loans. 
All the analyses are performed with a “mesoeconomic” data set acquired from the Bank of Italy, 
whose main characteristics are explained in detailed in the appendix.  The next section briefly discusses 
the motivations for this methodological choice, after presenting a brief survey on the empirical research 
on agents’ heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for Italy. Section 3 and its 
subsections contains a preliminary and descriptive analysis of the dataset employed here.  Section 4 and 
its subsections contain the econometric analyses. Section 5 contains a few concluding remarks. 
 
2. Empirical research on monetary policy transmission in Italy 
    A common feature of the Italian empirical analyses on monetary policy transmission is the 
emphasis on agents’ heterogeneity, credit market structure and, to a lesser extent,  geographic differences  3 
and inequalities among different regions.  A great deal of this research has been performed by economists 
from the Research Department of the Bank of Italy and published on “Temi di Discussione”, a publication 
from the Research Department of the Bank of Italy (for instance, Angeloni et al., 1995, Baffigi et al., 
1999,  Buttiglione et al., 1994, Cottarelli et al., 1997, De Bonis et al., 1997,  Focarelli et al, 1998, Rinaldi 
Russo et al, 1999), which, apart from being a prestigious Italian research institution, enjoys a privileged 
access to the generality of individual banking data for research purpose while guaranteeing, at the same 
time, strict confidentiality of the data, according to the existing regulations. Angeloni et al. (1995), by 
performing impulse response functions with aggregate time-series data referred to different size classes of 
banks show (for the sample period from 1987,1 to 1993, 12) that large-size banks tend to raise their 
lending rates more than small banks in periods of tight money and associate this phenomenon to 
monopoly power in local markets and customer relationships. Surprisingly they also find that the impact 
of monetary policy seems to be stronger in large companies than in the smaller ones, due, again, to the 
peculiar kind of customer relationships existing in local credit markets. Apart from these peculiar results, 
Angeloni et al. obtain evidence consistent with the credit view: the interbank market is weakly exogenous 
to the bond market, the interbank and bond market are weakly exogenous to the loan and deposit markets, 
and, similarly to the results by Buttiglione and Ferri (1994), the spread between bank loan and long term 
Government bond is influenced by the fact that lending rates tend to overshoot bond market rates. A 
certain influence on this kind of literature has been played by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) methodology 
in analysing how the degree of stickiness of bank rates varies significantly from country to country. 
Cottarelli and Kourelis also find that interest rates stickiness does not seem to be affected by the credit 
market structure. Cottarelli et al. (1997), after a detailed analysis of Italian structural data  for the banking 
sector, apply Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) methodology to analyze the degree of stickiness of the interest 
rates in various Italian provinces, by taking into consideration the possible non-stationarity of lending 
rates and using individual bank data. Again, like Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), they find that Italian 
lending rates are indeed very sticky.  Significant differences in the amount of bad debts among different 
geographic areas are found by De Bonis and Ferrando (1997), who also show that the lending rates in the 
different Italian provinces are higher the more concentrated are the credit markets, the higher the market 
shares of the largest banks, the more risky each single credit intermediary and the higher the bank 
operational costs. Focarelli and Rossi (1998) estimate with cointegration techniques a bank credit demand 
function (which is assumed to depend negatively on the cost of bank credit and operational cash flow, and 
positively on the firms’ investments and on an alternative interest rate) which turns out to be very stable 
even in times of deep and frequent institutional changes.  On the other hand, more difficult and subject to 
different heterogeneous influences seems to be the demand for bank credit in the various Italian region: 
for instance, in the North-East, real variables seem to determine a strong effect, while elasticity with  4 
respect to the opportunity cost seems to be lower.  The relevance of geographic areas is again emphasized 
by Finaldi Russo and Rossi (1999), who find localization in industrial districts to be a relevant and 
significant variable.  
  The focus of most empirical contributions in this research field is on agents’ heterogeneity and its 
implications for the transmission of monetary shocks and for the process of aggregation of different 
observable variables. Obviously, all this does not seem to match with the “new econometrics” 
methodological approach, which postulates that the macroeconomic relations to be estimated have to be 
microfounded on the basis of a representative agent model.  Since it is very hard to capture any 
heterogeneity within the representative agent framework, at least three theoretical attitudes seem to be 
possible in this regard. The first one consists of not taking too literally the “new econometrics” approach 
and still performing empirical analyses with aggregate time series based on theoretical assumptions only 
defined in aggregate terms. A good argument in this regard is provided by Blinder (1986) who claims that 
the use of specific properties associated to the representative agent’s utility function may cause serious 
bias in the estimates, since “for many goods, the primary reason for a downward sloping market demand 
curve may be that more people drop out of the market as the price rises, not that each individual 
consumer reduces his purchases”
1. Another argument lies in the fact that the utility function of a 
representative agent is actually a “non-microfounded macroeconomic function”: it could be theoretically 
obtained by integration on the basis of an aggregate consumption, and its analitycal form is simply based 
on “ad hoc” assumptions
2.   
  Of course, a second (and very popular) theoretical attitude consists of only performing empirical 
studies with individual microdata, in order to properly capture the different and asymmetric effects that 
might be generated by heterogeneous agents and – at the same time – avoid any Lucas’ critique objection.  
There is no doubt that this approach is very appropriate, but some residual (although relevant) problems 
might arise from sampling bias, since it is very difficult to exclude that some specific categories of 
individuals can be underrepresented (for instance, very small firms, in case one wishes to study the impact 
of monetary policy on the industrial sector of an economy).  For all these reasons, we follow a third 
approach and perform empirical analyses with an intermediate or “mesoeconomic” level of data 
aggregation might provide  a relevant source of information. Some goods arguments in this regard might 
also be provided by the recent literature on the statistical properties of aggregated and disaggregated data.  
Forni and Lippi (1997), for instance, show that the conventional mainstream econometric assumption on 
                                                            
1 Blinder, cit.,  p. 76 
2 In addition Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Kahneman (1994), Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997) report a very extended 
experimental evidence showing that the actual behaviour of individuals choosing in conditions of uncertainty is characterized 
by the so-called “status quo bias” and can be modelled with a “kinked utility function”, extremely different from any analytical 
form commonly employed to model a “nicely behaved” utility function.  
  5 
the fact that only one macroeconomic source of shocks is common to heterogeneous agents is rejected by 
very extended empirical analyses. In addition, they show that many statistical properties (like, for 
instance, Granger causality) existing at the level of individual agents do not survive aggregation, while 
aggregated time series show statistical properties that are absent in the individual data that constitute 
them. All this suggests that “mesoeconomic” empirical analyses can be as informative as the more 
conventional microeconometric and aggregate time series analyses, by providing a different perspective to 
investigate the interaction between macroeconomic policy variables and heterogeneous typologies of 
agents. 
 
3. A preliminary descriptive analysis 
  The graphics reported in the next sub-section and the descriptive statistics of the appendix allow 
already to identify some relevant structural phenomena. In the dataset, lenders are divided in three size 
classes: large and major banks, average size banks and small and minor banks. Loans are divided into 5 
size classes. The smaller categories have been aggregated into the class “C1”, which includes all loans 
smaller than 250 millions lira; class “C3” includes loans from 250 to 500 millions lira; class “C4” from 
500 millions to 1 billion liras; class “C5” all loans larger than one billion liras.  In most cases, the 
comparisons will be made among the three larges class sizes because (as explained in the appendix) the 
dataset contains many discontinuities in the statistical criteria of sampling and in the definitions of some 
relevant variables. Nevertheless, the comparison among the three largest size class is rather informative.
  
3.1 How heterogeneous  are lending rates? 
  The first structural feature that will be considered here is the different behaviour of lending rates 
according to the different kinds of size classes of borrowers and geographic areas, for each given size 
class of borrowers. In this case, in order to make the graphics easier to read, we have compared the data 
referred to the first observation of each time series, the median observation and the final observation, by 
using histograms. This kind of graphical representation (usually not employed for data and observations 
of this kind, but rather to represent frequencies), although unusual, allows seeing more directly the 
structural differences analysed here. No precise or uniform relation  can be detected between the lender 
size (for a given class size of loan)  in the various areas, by simply observing the data and without 
recourse to multivariate analysis, given the potential effects of borrower risk and the demand 
expectations. 
  As one can see from the graphics, a higher interest rate from large and major banks is only 
detectable in “area 3” (corresponding to Tuscany, Marche and Umbria) for all the size classes of loans, 
while for the loan classes “C3” and “C4” is also detectable in “area 1” (Piedmont, Val d’Aosta and  6 
Liguria) and in “area 5” (Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia and Basilicata). In all the other cases, there is no precise 
pattern (at least without using econometric methods) between the lender size and the level of the interest 
rates. This means that there seems to be no precise link between the lenders size and their market power. 
For this reason, other variables, different from the lender size are employed in the econometric analysis as 
proxies for the lender’s market power, in particular, as shown in section 4.1, we employ the spread 
between maximum lending rate and minimum borrower’s rate for each class size and in each geographic 
area. 
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For what concerns the behaviour of interest rates for each class size of loans according to the 
different lenders sizes and geographic areas a certain “geographical pattern”: “area 5” (Abruzzi, Molise, 
Puglia and Basilicata) and “area 6” (campania, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardinia) show almost constantly 
higher lending rates than the other areas.  Also “area 4” (Lazio) would show higher lending rates than the 
other three areas, excepting for the loan class “C5” including the loans larger than 1 billion liras. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c3" by area from 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c3" by area from 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c4" by area from 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c4" by area from 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c5" by area from 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lend. rates to loan size class "c5" by area from 




















































  A very precise pattern, on the contrary is detectable in the behaviour of interest rates according to 
the different class sizes of loans in the various geographic areas (as observed for each given lender size 
class). In particular, the relation between the loan size class and the level of the interest rate is particularly 
evident if one compares the interest rate level between the loan class “C5” and the other categories. In 
addition, the interest rate to she smaller class size of loans is constantly higher than the interest rate to the 
other classes. An exception to this apparent negative relation between loan size class and lending rates is 
given by the lending rates from average size banks (B2) in areas 3, 5, 6 and from small and minor banks 
(B3) in “area 5” where the negative relation between lending rate and loan size does not exist for the 
intermediate size classes of loans, although it still exists between those and the two extreme loan size 
classes.  All these data would be confirmed, and be also more evident in the descriptive statistical tables 
of the appendix. 
Of course, the relation between loan size and level of lending rate might just be apparent and 
explained by different theoretical variables, such as risk and demand expectations: this is shown in the 
very simple econometric analysis of the next sections, where the estimates with proxies “capturing” risk 
and the different market power of lenders and borrowers yield completely non-significant dummies for the 
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4. Some simple econometrics  
  Heterogeneity in  bank credit and lending rates has been analysed in many different ways, as 
briefly discussed in section 2. The approach followed here is both unconventional and very simple. The 
first equation estimated (and shown in sub-section 4.1) is meant to investigate on the main determinants 
of heterogeneity in lending rates, for a given policy regime and is based on a simple “textbook” statement: 
when monetary policy is mainly based (like in the Italian context) on the control of interest rates, the rate 
of discount does not only display general attitude of the policy makers, but also constitutes a “topical” 
interest rate affecting the whole set of lending rates.  The level of the latter will depend on the borrower 
risk, competitive context, and demand expectations. In other words, we study the spread between each 
specific lending rate (from each size class of lenders to each loan size class, in each geographic area and  20 
for each quarter) and the discount rate in order to verify to what extent appropriate proxies for the 
category-specific risk, for the relative market power of lenders and borrowers, size dummies for lenders 
and loans, geographic dummies can explain heterogeneity in these categories of lenders.  Most 
contributions in the literature briefly described in section 2 are based on a priori specifications or 
sometimes apply the “general-to-specific” methodology in a simplistic way by determining the lag 
structure of the model only on the basis of the t-statistics and without performing appropriate joint test for 
linear restrictions on a general “unrestricted” model. In this paper, we attempt to apply in a rigorous way 
Hendry (1985, 1988) and Harvey (1989) methodology: the final “parsimonious” specifications are strictly 
determined by applying joint “variable deletion tests” in a “general unrestricted” model with four time 
lags: The variables appearing in the estimates with lower  levels of significance have not been eliminated 
because the zero-restrictions on their coefficient have been rejected in preliminary general “variable 
deletion tests”. This does not strictly apply to the dummies, which have been tested jointly for the sake of 
our comments, in order to confront their values and level of significance. The appendix contains therefore 
the “general unrestricted” specifications of the models and the “variable deletion tests” performed to 
obtain the final specifications.  Of course, by assessing the level of significance of the various regressors 
one has to consider that we are dealing with very volatile (and heterogeneous) financial variables. Also for 
this reason all the tests have been performed in the White “robust to heteroskedasticity” version (White, 
1980, 1984). In a sense, the results of sub-section might be considered an extension of the descriptive 
analysis of section 3, since the point is not to identify a precise behaviour equation, but rather to measure 
and compare the impact of some theoretical and structural variables on the spread between lending rate 
and monetary policy rate.  
  The second equation estimated is meant to detect the possible existence of a hierarchy in lending 
behaviour and again is based on a very simple consideration. While it is certainly not possible to associate 
the loan size class to the size of the borrower, the largest loan size class is certainly more affected than the 
other two by the behaviour of large and powerful companies with higher market power.  Therefore it 
seems reasonable to ask ourselves whether the share (and not the absolute amount) of loans granted to the 
largest class is demand determined. If so, for a given level of loans supplied by the banking system the 
share of loans to the whole of the other size classes is necessarily residually determined and cannot be 
demand-determined. For the sake of our estimates, we seek to verify whether the share of loans to the 
largest size class is negatively correlated to its price, positively correlated to the bad debts (since 
borrowers have obviously incentives to renegotiate them, or, at least, to seek an accommodative behaviour 
from the bank) and positively correlated to the demand expectations.  This last point, while being 
consistent with a “demand-determined” lending behaviour, is not consistent with the phenomenon of  
“flight-to-quality”.  21 
  The smallest loan size class (“c1”, with  less than 250 millions lira), as discussed in detail in the 
appendix, contains several elements of discontinuity in the time series and non-homogeneity in the 
definition of the relevant variables. For this reason this class could not be considered in the estimates, 
while, on the contrary, it has been included in the descriptive analysis of section 2.  In any case, since this 
specific size class mainly includes credit to households and very small individual firms (like small shops), 
its exclusion does not affects the informational power of the second econometric analysis testing for the 
“demand-determined” behaviour of the largest size-class loans. The definition of the remaining loan size 
classes (c3, from 250 millions lira to 500 millions, c4, from 500 millions to 1 billion lira, c5, above 1 
billion lira) have been “inherited” by our data set from the sampling criteria of the Bank of Italy and partly 
reflect (as discussed in the appendix) the constraint imposed by the norms on confidentiality of banking 
data.  
 
3.1 The spread between lending rate and policy rate.  
  Since we cannot exclude simultaneity between some of the regressors and the dependent variables, 
the estimates have been performed with the method of instrumental variables. The software employed is 
DPD (Arellano-Bond, 1988 and further versions), the instrument employed for each variable (obviously 
excluding the dummies) is the lagged variable itself. 
TABLE  1 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ESTIMATES 
CONST = intercept 
I2 = dummy for the average-sized banks. 
I3 = dummy for the “small and minors” banks (according to the Bank of Italy classification). 
c3 = dummy for the loan size class “c3” (i.e. from 250 millions lira to 500 millions lira). 
c4 = dummy for the loan size class “c3” (i.e. from 500 millions lira to 1 billion lira). 
c5_t  = ratio between the bank overdrafts granted to the category “c5” and the total sum of bank 
overdrafts granted to categories “c3”, “c4” and “c5”. 
isco = expected demand for the next 3-4 months (ISCO data, based on entrepreneurs interviews). It is a 
proxy for the firms’ forward-looking expectations and can assume positive or negative values, since it 
expresses expectations on the possible increase or decrease in demand. 
so_u = ratio between bad debts and used credit, for each geographic area, for each year, from each size 
cathegory of banks to each size cathegory of loan facilities; because of the discontinuity in the criteria of 
statistical sampling followed by the Bank of Italy, (briefly discussed in the appendix) the ratio does not 
include the laon credit commitment. The variable has been used as a proxy for the “observation-specific” 
risk. 
ta_d = tat - tan 
tan = interest rate on loans by the Bank of Italy, inclusive of any additional charge. 
tat = interest rate on loan facilities , for each geographic area, foer each year, from each class size of 
banks to each size class of loan facilities. 
tdif = tma - tmi  22 
tma = maximum oblservable alternative interest rate for the loans facilities of each size cathegory of 
banks for all the size cathegories of overdrafts, in each geographic area in each year.. 
tmi = minimum oblservable alternative interest rate for the customers demanding loans facilities of a 
given size from all the possible alternative size cathegories of banks in each geographic area, in each year. 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Each observation unit is the credit (and interest rates) from each size class of lenders to each loans 
size class, in each geographic area, for each quarter. There are 3 size classes of lenders 3 loan size classes, 
6 geographic areas, 33 quarters, which makes it 54 longitudinal units observed fo 33 periods.  The 
variable “so_u” is a proxy for the risk specific to each specific class of borrower from each size class of 
lender, in each geographic area in a given year and quarter. Therefore its level (and possibly its increase) 
expected to be  positively correlated with the spread “ta_d”, since the lending rate must include a risk 
premium. The variable “tdif” is a proxy for the competitive context. A higher spread between the 
maximum lending rate available to the relevant size class of lenders and the minimum lending rate 
available to the relevant loan size class reflects a situation of higher competition among banks and larger 
possibilities of choice for the borrowers. The rationale for using this variable instead of only using more 
conventional “structural” variables or size variables to capture the market power of the counterparts lies in 
the fact that the competitive context might change much more quickly than structural variables, 
sometimes under the effect of strategies performed by medium-sized and even small firms and banks. 
This variable is then expected to be negatively correlated with the spread “ta_d”.  The variable “isco” 
represent the general expectations of the economy: if one accepted the assumption of rational expectations 
it should be common to all the agents (since, in particular, this variable is based on publically available 
interviews on entrepreneurs). It constitutes again an element of general risk evaluation, at a 
macroeconomic level, however it turns out to be totally non significant in the equation for “ta_d”. On the 
basis of all the considerations made before, the following general unrestricted model has been estimated: 
          4         4        4             
ta_dijt=CONST+Σαt-kta_dijt-k+Σβt-ktdifijt-k+Σγt-kso_uijt-k+ 
                 k=1         k=0                 k=0                 
       
4 
 +  Σ φt-k iscot-k  + 
    
k=1        
  + dummies for the loan sizes + 
 
  + dummies for banks size + 
 
+ dummies for the geographic area + 
 
+ white noise          (1) 
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  The results of the estimates and the “variable deletion tests” which have determined the final and 
“parsimonious “ specification are reported in the appendix. The final “parsimonious” specification yields 
the estimates of Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
FINAL “PARSIMONIOUS” SPECIFICATION 
EQUATION FOR THE SPREAD BETWEEN INTEREST RATES ON BANK OVERDRAFT AND 
MONETARY POLICY RATE (INTEREST RATE ON LOANS BY THE BANK OF ITALY)  




                               D.P.D.  RESULTS  
 
LEVELS     IV 
 
Number of firms:     54   Sample period is 1991 QII  to 1998 QI 
Observations:      1512        Degrees of freedom:      1497  
 
Dependent variable is:    ta_d  
 
Instruments used are: 
   CONST ta-d(-2) so_u(-1) so_u(-2) tdif(-4) tdif(-5)       c3       c4  




ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
 
   Wald test of joint significance:     2230.202567    df =  12  
   Wald test - jt sig of  ind dums:        1.571201    df =   2  
 
Var             Coef         Std. Error       T-Stat         P-Value 
   CONST       1.302663       1.159927       1.123056       0.261414  
ta_d(-1)       0.748006       0.124735       5.996774       0.000000  
    so_u       5.543778       6.650326       0.833610       0.404501  
so_u(-1)      -5.534232       6.553838      -0.844426       0.398431  
tdif(-3)      -0.958507       1.332951      -0.719086       0.472088  
tdif(-4)       0.750205       0.976935       0.767917       0.442537  
      c3       0.057856       1.302231       0.044429       0.964563  
      c4       0.072287       1.034254       0.069893       0.944279  
      a1      -0.032614       0.085680      -0.380652       0.703462  
      a3       0.125009       0.094511       1.322695       0.185937  
      a4       0.249281       0.109245       2.281853       0.022498  
      a5       0.393597       0.210871       1.866527       0.061968  
      a6       0.303455       0.241046       1.258909       0.208063  
      I2      -0.247605       0.198526      -1.247216       0.212318  
      I3      -0.392050       0.325261      -1.205340       0.228072  
 
Robust test for  first-order serial correlation:    -2.878  [   54 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation:    -0.386  [   54 ] 
 
  The variables referred to the overdue bank credits (“so_u” and “so_u(t-1)”) are only significant at 
a level of confidence of around 60%, while “tdiff(-3)” and “tdif(-4)” (capturing the bargaining power of 
the banks) are only significant at a level of confidence of 53% and 56% respectively, although they were 
much more significant in the “general unrestricted model”, which also did not support a linear restriction  24 
setting their coefficient equal to zero, in spite of their low level of significance shown by the t-statistics. 
Therefore, their  low level of significance might be due to the contemporaneous presence of other 
dummies (which are also meant to “capture” other relevant effects associated to the specific behaviour of 
lenders in their approach to risk or investment strategies and the specific risk of some geographic areas). 
By looking at the coefficients of tdif(-3) and tdif(-4) one could interpret the dependent variable “ta_d” as 
negatively affected by the variable “tdif(-3)” (with a coefficient close to –0.20) and also negatively 
affected by the difference “tdif(-3)-tdif(-4)” (with a coefficient of close to –0.75), although these two 
variables are not very significant. The variable referred to the size dummies of the bank loans are not 
significant at all, although they were significant in the general unrestricted model with a level of 
confidence of 76% and 85%.  However, since for the sake of our comments all the dummies have been 
considered jointly, the loan size dummies appear in the estimates. The results suggest that the persistently 
higher interest rate set by the banks on the smaller sized overdrafts might not be simply associated to the 
size of the credit contract, but could reflect the impact of other more conventional variables, associated to 
the riskiness of the borrower, the competitive context (captured by the variable “tdif”), the size of the 
lender, whose dummies turn out to be significant at a level of confidence of 77% and 79%, and, partly, to 
the geographic area (specially for what concerns the region Lazio, whose dummy is significant with the 
level of confidence of 97%, but also for the areas 3, 5 and 6, whose dummies are significant at the levels 
of confidence of 82%, 94% and 80% respectively). Finally, the final parsimonious specification 
marginally shows some marginal first-order residual correlation. 
 
3.2 Are largest loans demand-determined?  
  As explained before, our conjecture is that the share of largest loans over the total amount of loans 
granted to the sum of the size classes “c3”, “c4”, “c5” is “demand determined” if it is negatively 
correlated with its own interest rate, positively correlated with the demand expectations, and reflect an 
accomodative behaviour from the banks. On the basis of the previous considerations, the following 
general unrestricted model has been estimated (see the appendix for the details and the variable deletion 
tests). 
           4                    4                4         4          4 
c5_tijt=CONST+Σηt-kc5_tijt-k+Σϕt-ktatt-k+Σλt-ktanijt+Σθt-kso_u+Σξt-ktma+
          
         k=1       k=0             k=0       k=0              k=0 
  + dummies for banks size + 
 
+ dummies for the geographic area + 
 
+ white noise        (2) 
 
  As an alternative lending rate “tma” and not “tmi” has been employed: this constitute a  25 
conservative choice to test for “dmand determined” behaviour of the dependent variable, since “tma” 
reflects the incentive of the banks rather than borrowers. By looking at the final “parsimonious” 
specification reported below, we see that the own interest rate with three lags “tat(-3)” is largely 
significant and has a negative coefficient, as expected.  By looking at the lag structure of the variable 
“so_u” and at the values of its coefficient one could say that the share of loans to class c5 is roughly 
positively correlate with an increase of the bad debts over the last 2-3 quarters. However the second and 
third lag are significant at the level of confidence of 88% and 83% respectively, while the 4th lag is not 
very significant (although in preliminary a variable deletion test the zero-restriction on its coefficient was 
rejected).  Nevertheless, by looking at the (very close in absolute value) coefficients of  “so_u(-2)” and 
“so_u(-3)”, what seems to be significant is rather the “increase” in the bad debts: this again is consistent 
with an accomodative behaviour of banks and, therefore, a demand determined share of “c5”.  Also the 
positive (and significant at the level of confidence of 83%) if the variable “isco” is consistent with a 
“demand determined” behaviour. None of the other variables are significant and it is interesting to remark 
in this case that no dummy variable turned out to be significant. 
TABLE 3 
FINAL “PARSIMONIOUS” SPECIFICATION 
EQUATION FOR THE RATIO BETWEEN THE LARGEST SIZE CLASS OF LOAN CREDITS 
AND THE TOTAL CREDIT GRANTED FOR ALL SIZE CLASSES   
The data employed for the estimates cover the period 1990 QI - 1998 QIV 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
                               D.P.D.  RESULTS  
 
LEVELS     IV 
 
Number of firms:     18   Sample period is 1991 QII  to 1998 QI  
Observations:       504       Degrees of freedom:       497  
 
Dependent variable is:    c5_t  
 
Instruments used are: 




ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
 
   Wald test of joint significance:    31994.696540    df =   6  
 
Var             Coef         Std. Error       T-Stat         P-Value 
   CONST       0.026569       0.009274       2.864828       0.004172  
c5_t(-1)       0.977520       0.009422     103.745459       0.000000  
 tat(-3)      -0.000630       0.000262      -2.403433       0.016242  
so_u(-2)       0.113115       0.072979       1.549970       0.121149  
so_u(-3)      -0.103423       0.075927      -1.362147       0.173151  
so_u(-4)      -0.011530       0.021300      -0.541309       0.588295  
    isco       0.000100       0.000073       1.373599       0.169566  
 
Robust test for  first-order serial correlation:    -0.154  [   18 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation:     1.412  [   18 ] 
 
  26 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper contains an empirical investigation on the various potential sources of heterogeneity in 
Italian bank lending rates, according to the lender size, the size class of bank loans, and the geographic 
area, for a period of observation going from 1990QI to 1998QIV, using a data set specifically acquired 
from the Bank of Italy. 
The first econometric analysis investigates the behaviour of the spread between the lending rate 
(from each size class of lenders to each size class of loans in each of the six areas, in the estimating 
period) and the monetary policy rate, since in this context, the amount of the spread might be interpreted 
as a diversified and heterogeneous reaction to a given “policy measure”, such as indicated by monetry 
policy interest rate. While the preliminary descriptive statistical analysis seems to show a clear and 
persistent negative correlation between the class sizes of bank loans and the level of lending rates, the 
econometric analysis shows that this correlation can be well explained by more conventional theoretical 
variables, such as the borrower-specific risk and a proxy for the relative bargaining power between lender 
and borrower. Like in other Italian contributions on this kind of literature, it is also found, for some 
geographic areas of the country, a persistently higher level of lending rates, while the significance of 
dummies for the lenders size is more dubious and the dummies for the loan size classes are certainly not 
significant 
. The last empirical analysis finally identifies an interesting source of heterogeneity in the fact that 
that the share of loans to the largest size group acts consistently with a “demand-determined” behaviour. 
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APPENDIX 
Sources and criteria for statistical  surveys followed by the Bank of Italy 
A) SOURCES 
A detailed description of the classification criteria can be found in "Supplementi al Bollettino 
Statistico" , Banca d’Italia, Anno V  Numero 32  -   16 June 1995.  The dataset employed for this paper 
has been provided by the Statistical Bureau of the Bank of Italy, on the basis of a specific request and 
application. Therefore, although it has been structured and organized on the basis of our research plan, it 
is necessarily based on the criteria of sampling and aggregation employed by the Bank of Italy for what 
concerns the definitions of the different size classes of loans from different size classes of banks.  In 
addition, the degree of disaggregation is conditioned by the Italian regulation on banking secrecy, stating 
that each disaggregated observation of credit flows from particular size classes of lenders, to particular 
size classes of borrowers, for given geographic areas must be based at least on three observations. The 
same applies to the data concerning interest rates, which are recorded by the Bank of Italy on the basis of 
a non-compulsory quarterly report produced by a sample of 80 banks in all the country. For these reasons, 
only a limited degree of disaggregation has been possible. The complete dataset employed for this 
empirical analysis is contained in the folder “dataBI.zip” and cred.zip”, now available on the internet at 
the site   www.economia.unimo.it/worpap/   .  
  The file “dataBI.zip” contains the raw dataset obtained from the Bank of Italy in the file 
“Modena.xls”, and the data processed for the estimates in all the other files of the folder contain.  The file 
“cred.zip” contain all the data processed for the descriptive analysis and the graphics.  
  The data on interbank and foreign deposits and securities held by banks in their portfolios are 
based on reports from each individual bank to the Board of Inspection of the Bank of Italy. The data on 
loan credit commitments, total used credit, total granted credit and bad debts are based on notice from 
each individual bank to  “Centrale dei Rischi” (the Department of Bank of Italy charged with monitoring 
the system risk). The amounts are expressed in million lira and include both the operations in liras and in 
foreign currency. 
  The interest rates on loan credits and on deposits have been obtained from the respective quarterly 
statistical survey, which includes observations approximately 70 banks. The data on interest rates on bank 
lending and deposits are only referred to the operations in liras.  
 
B) LIMITS FOR THE STATISTICAL SURVEYS 
  From January 1996 the obligation to signal risks to “Centrale dei Rischi” only concerns loan cash  
credits and credit commitments for amounts greater that 150 millions lira, while before that date the limit 
was 80 millions lira. This creates a relevant discontinuity in the time series referred to the smallest loan 
size, which, as a consequence, could not be employed for the econometric estimates and has been 
included only from 1990 until 1996 in the graphics and descriptive statistics. 
  For the bad debts reported to Centrale dei rischi, there is no lower limit from february 1991, while 
the limit was 10 millions lira before 1991.  This creates yet another source of discontinuity in the time 
series referred to the smallest loan size. 
  For what concerns the interest rates on loan cash credits and loan credit commitments, the lower 
limits for the credit they are referred to is the same as the one for the credits reported to Centrale dei 
Rischi. For the interest rates on deposits, the observations only refer to the deposits with amount larger 
than 20 millions Italian lira. Loan cash credits until December 31st 1996 include overdue payments, while 
from from January 1997 the latter are reported separately.  This generates another time discontinuity for 
all the loan sizes.  data for net interbank deposits and foreign deposits include interbank transfers, while 
any other variable variable in the dataset does not include them. 
 
 
C) SAMPLING AND CLASS CRITERIA FOR THE VARIABLES OF THE DATASE 
  All the size classes have been calculated on the basis of loan cash credits granted by the whole 
banking ssystem to each customer (see tables below).  29 
  For bad debts, since 1997 the distribution of the borrowers among different classes is determined 
on the basis of the global amounts for which each borrower has overdue payments. 
  For what concerns loan credit commitments, since 1997 they have no longer been distributed (in 
the survey form the Bank of Italy) by class size of the credit lines.  For this reason, since 1997 the only 
observation available from the Bank of Italy was the total credit to all of the borrowers, and this specific 
variable could not be used for the estimates.  Therefore the data employed in the econometric analyses are 
only based on the loan cash credits. 
  The geographic areas (see tables below) refer to the localization of the local agency of the bank 
reporting the data to the statistical survey. 
  The distribution by size classes for banks (see tables below) has been updated in 1995 and also 
includes the former “long term credit special institutions” and “special credit sections” (see "Supplementi 
al Bollettino Statistico" , Banca d’Italia, Anno V  Numero 32  -   16 June 1995). For the previous periods 
the size classification only concerned ordinary banks, which broadly correspond to the present “banks 
with short run deposits”. 
  We report below a few tables summarizing all the criteria of the statistical surveys form the Bank 
of Italy and all the definitions concerning the size classes and geographic areas. 
  Because of the discontinuities of the definitions in the Bank of Italy dataset, the Bank of Italy size 
classes “1” and “2” have been aggregated into the size class “c1” for the analyses performed here. This 
means that the corresponding interest rate is the weighted average of the interest rates of the two 
corresponding classes.  A similar aggregation has been done for the bank deposits and the corresponding 
interest rates, which, in any case, turned out to be always non significant in preliminary econometric 
analyses referred to the interest rate on bank credit and to the overdrafts granted to the largest size class of 
customers.  Furthermore, since the interest rate on deposits are (in Italy) very stable and show very little 





of loan credits 
(DEFINITIONS 
OF THE BANK 
OF ITALY) 
Description of the size 
classes employed by the 
Bank of Italy 
Observed variable  Definition for the 
corresponding classes of 
loans included in the tables 
and graphics and for the 
dummy variable included in 
the estimates 
1  Less than 80 million lira 
(between 1990 and 1995); 
less than 150 million lira 
(between 1996 and 1998) 
outstanding amount of 
loan credit 
 c1 (in our tables the class c1 
includes the sum of the Bank 
of Italy size classes “1” and 
“2”) 
2  From 80 to 250 millions 
lira (until 1995); from 150 
to 250 million lira 
(between 1996 and 1998)  
outstanding amount of 
loan credit 
 c1 (in our tables the class c1 
includes the sum of the Bank 
of Italy size classes “1” and 
“2”) 
3  From 250 to 500 million 
lira 
outstanding amount of 
loan credit 
c3 
4  From 500 million lira to 1 
billion  
outstanding amount of 
loan credit 
c4 
5  over 1 billion  outstanding  amount  of 
loan  credit 




of loan credits 




OF THE BANK 
OF ITALY) 
Description of the size 
classes employed by the 
Bank of Italy 
Observed variable  Definition for the 
corresponding classes of 
loan credits to which the 
interest rates refer in the 
tables and graphics 
1  Less than 100 million lira 
(until 1996); less than 150 
million lira (from 1997) 
Average interest rate on 
loan credits of the given 
size class 
c1 
2  From 100 to 250 million 
lira (until 1996); from 150 
to 250 million lira (form 
1997)  
Average interest rate on 
loan credits of the given 
size class 
c1 
3  From 250 to 500 million 
lira 
Average interest rate on 
loan credits of the given 
size class 
c3 
4  From 500 million lira to 1 
billion 
Average interest rate on 
loan credits of the given 
size class 
c4 
5  over 1 billion  Average  interest  rate  on 
loan credits of the given 
size class 
c5  31 
 
 
Size Classes of 
Banks 
Description of the exact definition employed by the Bank 
of Italy 
Definition for the 
corresponding size 
classes of banks included 
in the tables and for the 
dummy variable included 
in the estimates  
 
1  major banks and large sized banks        I1 
2  Average sized banks        I2 




to the  
Regions included in the geographic area  Definition  for  the  dummy 
variable included in the 
estimates 
1  Piemonte, Val d'Aosta, Liguria        a1 
2  Lombardia, Triveneto, Emilia Romagna        a2 
3  Toscana, Marche, Umbria        a3 
4  Lazio        a4 
5  Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata        a5 










are referred to 
Description of the size classes 
employed by the Bank of Italy 
Observed variable 
1  Less than 100 million lira   Average interest rate on bank deposits of the given size 
class 
2  From 100 to 250 million lira   Average interest rate on bank deposits of the given size 
class 
3  From 250 to 500 million lira   Average interest rate on bank deposits of the given size 
class 
4  From 500 million lira to 1 billion  Average interest rate on bank deposits of the given size 
class 
5  Over 1 billion  Average interest rate on bank deposits of the given size 
class 
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D) A BRIEF SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN ALL THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS 
   loans  
from I1 to c1 
loans from I2 to c1 loans from I3 to c1 
average interest rate for c1 for all the 
areas 
16.86705 16.52475 15.91545 
variance for c1 for  all the areas  2.541764 2.170026 3.577675 
     
   loans from I1 to c3 loans from I2 to c3 loans from I3 to c3 
average interest rate for c3 for all the 
areas 
15.60936 15.15257 14.89092 
variance for c3 for all the areas  4.048736 3.552005  4.42039 
     
   loans from I1 to c4 loans from I2 to c4 loans from I3 to c4 
average interest rate for c4 for all the 
areas 
15.16653 14.72696 14.27933 
variance for c4 in all the areas  3.9862 3.599013  4.3118 
     
   loans from I1 to c5 loans from I2 to c5 loans from I3 to c5 
average interest rate for c5 in all the 
areas 
12.85701 12.54965 12.55033 
variance for 5 in all the areas  4.734899 4.039671 4.500353 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.  
 
 
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 1 
 all bank size  from I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a1 
15.7431 15.95678 15.72506 15.54746 
var. for c1 in a1  1.979536 2.012298 2.008203 2.002315 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a1 
14.40492 14.78237 14.26627 14.16611 
var. for c3 in a1  3.162326 3.204932  3,.63162 2.990966 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a1 
13.93973 14.31103 13.84119 13.66697 
var. for c4 in a1  3.288572 3.181843  3.54873 3.111772 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a1 
11.93172 11.99015 12.01479 11.79021 
var. for c5 in a1  3.848068 4.354332 3.788413 3.610673 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.  
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MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 2 
 all bank size  from I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a2 
15.77032 15.50911 15.98415 15.81769 
var. for c1 in a2  2.022209 2.016239 2.150746 1.916452 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a2 
14.50204 14.37267 14.71491 14.41854 
var. for c3 in a2  3.301466 3.298332  3.07674 3.664488 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a2 
13.87443 14.11513 14.14424 13.95566 
var. for c4 in a2  3.426298 3.450414 3.294419 3.726946 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a2 
11.94183 11.83155 11.92504  12.0689 
var. for c5 in a2  4.147299 4.731783 3.950131 3.989705 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.  
 
 
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 3 
 all bank size  from I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a3 
16.26506 16.62611 16.54421 15.62488 
var. for c1 in a3  2.341941 1.759564 2.220764 2.604152 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a3 
14.86557 15.31585 14.95864 14.32222 
var.for c3 in a3  3.951888 3.490071 4.638095 3.452015 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a3 
14.4187 14.83658 14.56143 13.85808 
var.for c4 in a3  4.103046 3.676795 4.779664 3.583915 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a3 
12.38576  12.8429 12.37386 11.94053 
var.for c5 in a3  4.419008 4.480293 4.474449 4.158398 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.  
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MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 4 
 all bank size  from I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a4 
16.792 17.39481 16.87112 16.11008 
var. for c1 in a4  1.747248 1.325765 1.652238 1.544723 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a4 
15.52946  15.9933 15.83293 14.76216 
var. for c3 in a4  3.169065 3.361136 2.390434 3.029693 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a4 
15.04198  15.52703 15.2425 14.3564 
var. for c4 in a4  3.163659 3.426189 2.334444 3.159273 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a4 
12.38232 12.55527 12.26988 12.32182 
var.for c5 in a4  3.458965 4.094882 3.051656 3.398884 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.  
 
 
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 5 
 all bank size  From I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a5 
17.86528 17.79964 17.24831  18.5479 
var. for c1 in a5  2.558648 1.794134 1.957937 3.258426 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a5 
16.21687 16.47638 15.74477 16.42947 
var. for c3 in a5  4.609047 3.741485 3.652608 6.375212 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a5 
15.63421 16.04618 15.51343 15.34301 
var.for c4 in a5  4.753072 3.643787 3.088822 7.546154 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a5 
13.61227 13.98716  13.1621 13.68754 
var. for c5 in a5  4.242804 3.608241 3.388026 5.637557 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.   35 
 
 
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE INTEREST RATES SET ON AVERAGE BY THE 
BANKS OF VARIOUS SIZE FOR THE VARIOS SIZE CLASSES OF LOAN CREDITS 
IN AREA 6 
 all bank size  from I1   from I2  from I3 
average interest 
rate for c1 in a6 
17.04591 17.91583 16.77564 16.44625 
var. for c1 in a6  2.309148 1.699835 1.792189 2.395098 
     
average interest 
rate for c3 in a6 
15.78683 16.71556 15.39789 15.24702 
var. for c3 in a6  3.761436  3.68598 2.898527 4.006274 
     
average interest 
rate for c4 in a6 
15.23935 16.16324 15.05896 14.49585 
var. for c4 in a6  3.62321 3.197539 2.897184 3.517479 
     
average interest 
rate for c5 in a6 
13.66008 13.93501 13.55223 13.49301 
var.for c5 in a6  3.55933 3.410671 3.983223 3.387823 
N.B. mean and variance referred to the size class “c1” cannot be compared with the other because it refers to a 
different and shorter observation period, where the interest rates have been, on average, higher.   36 
 
GENERAL UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
EQUATION FOR THE SPREAD BETWEEN INTEREST RATES ON BANK OVERDRAFT AND 
MONETARY POLICY RATE (INTEREST RATE ON LOANS BY THE BANK OF ITALY)  






                               D.P.D.  RESULTS  
 
LEVELS     IV 
 
Number of firms:     54      Sample period is 1991 QII  to 1998 QI  
Observations:      1512      Degrees of freedom:      1487  
 
Dependent variable is:    ta_d  
 
Instruments used are: 
   CONST ta_d(-2) ta_d(-3) ta_d(-4) ta_d(-5) so_u(-1) so_u(-2) so_u(-3)  
so_u(-4) so_u(-5) isco(-1) tdif(-1) tdif(-2) tdif(-3) tdif(-4) tdif(-5)  
      c3       c4       a1       a3       a4       a5       a6 IND DUMS  
 
 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
 
   Wald test of joint significance:      505.422951    df =  22  
   Wald test - jt sig of  ind dums:        0.341599    df =   2  
        Wald test selected by user:       10.299139    df =  10  
   Testing:ta_d(-2) ta_d(-3) ta_d(-4) so_u(-2) so_u(-3) so_u(-4)     isco  
    tdif tdif(-1) tdif(-2)  
 
Var             Coef         Std. Error       T-Stat         P-Value 
   CONST       0.918082       5.373138       0.170865       0.864330  
ta_d(-1)       3.237775       3.886986       0.832978       0.404857  
ta_d(-2)      -0.970432       1.540478      -0.629955       0.528724  
ta_d(-3)      -0.157001       0.433125      -0.362485       0.716989  
ta_d(-4)      -0.396844       0.909495      -0.436335       0.662594  
    so_u       5.501375       3.635302       1.513320       0.130198  
so_u(-1)      -3.951405       3.237292      -1.220590       0.222241  
so_u(-2)      -1.606319       3.287958      -0.488546       0.625163  
so_u(-3)       1.047737       2.816219       0.372037       0.709866  
so_u(-4)      -3.611479       3.118469      -1.158093       0.246826  
    isco       0.046276       0.125520       0.368677       0.712369  
    tdif      -2.573195       3.468352      -0.741907       0.458144  
tdif(-1)       0.662969       2.671158       0.248196       0.803983  
tdif(-2)       0.474065       0.452225       1.048293       0.294504  
tdif(-3)       0.283370       0.289738       0.978022       0.328063  
tdif(-4)       0.339537       0.287402       1.181402       0.237443  
      c3      -3.979281       2.735695      -1.454577       0.145786  
      c4      -3.158094       2.214824      -1.425889       0.153900  
      a1       0.022598       0.234861       0.096217       0.923349  
      a3      -0.057324       0.479939      -0.119441       0.904926  
      a4      -0.255889       0.967343      -0.264527       0.791374  
      a5      -0.694210       1.738182      -0.399389       0.689607  
      a6      -0.911166       1.378700      -0.660888       0.508684  
      I2      -0.140736       0.608300      -0.231359       0.817036  
      I3      -0.416781       1.109827      -0.375536       0.707262  
 
Robust test for  first-order serial correlation:    -0.814  [   54 ] 




  37 
GENERAL UNRESTRICTED MODEL 
EQUATION FOR THE SHARE OF CREDIT GRANTED TO THE LARGEST SIZE CLASS 
(“CLIENTS 5”) 
The data employed for the estimates cover the period 1990 QI - 1998 QIV 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
                               D.P.D.  RESULTS  
LEVELS     IV 
 
Number of firms:     18      Sample period is 1991 QII  to 1998 QI  
Observations:       504      Degrees of freedom:       473  
 
Dependent variable is:    c5_t  
 
Instruments used are: 
   CONST c5_t(-2) c5_t(-3) c5_t(-4) c5_t(-5)  tat(-1)  tat(-3)  tat(-4)  
 tat(-4)  tat(-5) so_u(-1) so_u(-2) so_u(-3) so_u(-4) so_u(-5)  tan(-1)  
 tan(-2)  tan(-3)  tan(-4)  tan(-5) isco(-1)  tma(-1)  tma(-2)  tma(-3)  




ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
 
   Wald test of joint significance:     4431.770670    df =  30  
        Wald test selected by user:        7.462959    df =  24  
   Testing:c5_t(-2) c5_t(-3) c5_t(-4)      tat  tat(-1)  tat(-2)  tat(-4)  
    so_u so_u(-1)      tan  tan(-1)  tan(-2)  tan(-3)  tan(-4)      tma  
 tma(-1)  tma(-2)  tma(-3)  tma(-4)       a1       a3       a4       a5  
      a6  
 
Var             Coef         Std. Error       T-Stat         P-Value 
   CONST      -0.138288       0.156984      -0.880902       0.378371  
c5_t(-1)       2.942707       2.112914       1.392725       0.163703  
c5_t(-2)      -2.005299       2.092366      -0.958388       0.337867  
c5_t(-3)       0.174508       0.296365       0.588829       0.555976  
c5_t(-4)      -0.011989       0.141317      -0.084839       0.932390  
     tat       0.027344       0.027825       0.982712       0.325749  
 tat(-1)      -0.013846       0.014940      -0.926768       0.354047  
 tat(-2)       0.004455       0.010317       0.431821       0.665872  
 tat(-3)      -0.003635       0.005215      -0.697092       0.485745  
 tat(-4)      -0.003304       0.006173      -0.535252       0.592476  
    so_u      -0.081250       0.166762      -0.487221       0.626102  
so_u(-1)       0.120028       0.180136       0.666317       0.505209  
so_u(-2)      -0.060010       0.052729      -1.138082       0.255086  
so_u(-3)       0.084269       0.064958       1.297276       0.194536  
so_u(-4)      -0.119746       0.099812      -1.199712       0.230251  
     tan      -0.007168       0.014392      -0.498050       0.618448  
 tan(-1)       0.008115       0.013108       0.619095       0.535854  
 tan(-2)       0.001665       0.004124       0.403840       0.686330  
 tan(-3)       0.000392       0.001968       0.199169       0.842131  
 tan(-4)       0.001837       0.002366       0.776374       0.437528  
    isco       0.001490       0.001720       0.866275       0.386339  
     tma      -0.024440       0.023699      -1.031243       0.302427  
 tma(-1)       0.007476       0.009783       0.764128       0.444791  
 tma(-2)       0.002505       0.006351       0.394353       0.693320  
 tma(-3)      -0.001077       0.003461      -0.311090       0.755733  
 tma(-4)       0.005157       0.006172       0.835599       0.403381  
      a1       0.000255       0.003423       0.074583       0.940547  
      a3       0.006086       0.007869       0.773465       0.439247  
      a4       0.003671       0.004724       0.777195       0.437044  
      a5       0.010938       0.013995       0.781585       0.434458  
      a6       0.002276       0.009911       0.229597       0.818405  
 
Robust test for  first-order serial correlation:    -0.978  [   18 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation:     1.005  [   18 ] 